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SECURITIES FRAUD-RULE lOb-5-TIPPEE LIABILITY REQUIRES BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BY TIPPER, AND
TIPPEE'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE BREACH. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S.
Ct. 3255 (1983).
An investment analyst for a broker-dealer firm received confidential information from a former officer of an insurance holding company. I The former officer alleged that the insurance company was
engaged in fraudulent insurance practices. 2 The analyst investigated
the allegations and disclosed the information he discovered to a
number of clients and other investors. 3 The corporation and many of
its officers and directors were subsequently indicted for fraud,4 and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated the analyst's
role in exposing the fraud. The SEC found that the analyst violated
section IO(b)S and Rule lOb-5 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
I. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3258 (1983). Neither the analyst nor the broker-

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

dealer firm owned or traded any of the insurance company's stock. The analyst
was actually a "tipping tippee," but the Court analyzed his liability under Rule
IOb-5 in the tipper-tippee context. Id at 3258-60. For a discussion of secondlevel tipping, see W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE § 5.03, at 162 (1979).
One allegation centered upon the creation of false insurance policies and records
to inflate the sales figures of one of th~ insurance company's subsidiaries. Dirks v.
SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
A reporter who, fearing libel charges, initially refused the analyst's request to report the fraud, later received a Pulitzer Prize nomination for an expose he published after trading in the securites was suspended. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824,
831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
After five institutional investors liquidated holdings worth more than $15,000,000
on the basis of the analyst'S information, the price of the corporation's stock plummeted and the New York Stock Exchange suspended trading in the securities.
Although both a former employee of the corporation and the reporter had informed the SEC of the allegations, a complaint against the company was not filed
until trading in the securities was suspended. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 832
(D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
Section 10 reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange-... (b) [t)o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any securities not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.c. § 78(j) (1982).
Rule IOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement ofa material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
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(1934 Act) by repeating material, nonpublic information to investors
who subsequently traded on the basis of the information. 7 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
on the ground that persons who receive material, nonpublic information from corporate insiders are bound by the insiders' fiduciary obligation to disclose the information or to abstain from trading. s The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that a tippee 9
assumes a duty to abstain or disclose only when the insider breaches his
fiduciary duty by disclosing the information, and the tippee knows or
should have known of the breach. IO
Although other provisions of the 1934 Act prohibit specific manipulative practices, II section 1O(b) is a general antifraud provision
designed to cover an "infinite variety" of fraudulent securities practices
that may be perpetrated upon the investing public. 12 Section lO(b) and
Rule IOb-5, which were issued under the 1934 Act, have been construed by both the courts and the SEC to prohibit insider trading. 13

7.

8.
9.
10.
II.
12.

13.

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1983). The duty to disclose or abstain is traditionally
thought to be based on subsection (c), but courts do not distinguish the subsections. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 834 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255
(1983); see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225 n.5 (1980).
In re Raymond L. Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~
82,812, at 83,950 (Jan. 22,1981), affd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S.
Ct. 3255 (1983). The analyst was also found to have violated section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.c. § 77q(a) (1982), a less inclusive fraud provision
that is limited to the "offer or sale" of any security. The SEC also determined that
the five institutional investors violated section 17(a) by trading on the basis of
Dirks' information. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3269 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
The term tippee denotes anyone who receives material, nonpublic information
from a corporate insider-the tipper. 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 9.20[6] (rev. ed. 1983).
Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3257-58 (1983).
See 15 U.S.c. §§ 77(q), 77(w), 77(www), 77(xxx), 78i(a)(I), 78n(e), 78k(a), 780(c),
78r(a), 78z (1982).
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 332 n.38 (1979); see Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.), reh'g denied, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del.
1951) (denying petition to reopen the case); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907 (1961).
See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1980); Frigitemp Corp.
v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 1975); Radiation
Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); In reCady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.c. 907, 911 (1961); Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373, 381 (1943).
Corporations are also prohibited from trading on insider information under Rule
IOb-5. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 830 n.12 (D. Del.
1951). See generally 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND
COMMODITIES FRAUD § 7.4(b)(a), 4(b)(b) (1979) (insider trading prohibited under
Rule IOb-5).
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Insider trading is trading in the securities of a company by a corporate
insider who trades on the basis of material,14 nonpublic information 15
concerning the company's stock. Officers, directors, and controlling
stockholders have traditionally been regarded as insiders. 16 The prohibition against insider trading is founded upon the premise that this
trading is inherently unfair to the uninformed investor. 17
Generally, under the common law of fraud, only affirmative misrepresentations were actionable. IS Judicial and administrative construction of Rule lOb-5 expanded the common law of fraud and made
omissions of material fact actionable by requiring corporate insiders
either to disclose publicly the inside information or abstain from trading. 19 Corporate insiders are currently regarded as fiduciaries of the
shareholders,20 and this relationship is considered the source of the in14. Material information is information that a reasonably prudent investor would
find relevant when making an investment decision. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457,462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
15. Nonpublic information includes information that is not lawfully available to the
investing public without the consent of the source and information that is lawfully
obtainable, but has not yet been disseminated to the investing public. Brudney,
supra note 12, at 322 n.2. Some commentators distinguish between corporate information-information from within the corporation involving assets or expected
earnings-and market information. The Supreme Court in Dirks stated that section lO(b) and Rule IOb-5 draw no such distinction. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct.
3255,3262 n.15 (1983); see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 n.1 (1980)
(Burger, c.J., dissenting).
16. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 9, § 9.20[4], at 9.79. Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act
provides a statutory definition of insider. 15 U.S.c. § 78p(a) (1982).
17. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1,2 (1982). Congress intended to eliminate the idea that
use of inside information by insiders was a normal emolument of corporate office.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). But see H.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 59-75 (1966) (inside trading
permits market price to move toward its real value).
18. Brudney, supra note 12, at 329 n.30.
19. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-30 (1980); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). Rule IOb-5 does not expressly forbid insider
trading or require disclosure of inside information. For the text of this rule, see
supra note 6. The scheme of federal securities legislation is premised on a disclosure philosophy. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-73 (1977).
20. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d
36,42 (3d Cir. 1947); see also 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1450-51 (2d ed.
1961). Under the prior "majority rule," corporate officers and directors were not
regarded as fiduciaries of the shareholders. Rather, the insider bore a duty to the
corporation itself not to misuse corporate funds. This position was eroded by
application of the "special facts doctrine." This doctrine imposed a disclosure
duty when the existence of special facts, such as superior knowledge or bargaining
position, required that the insider be considered a fiduciary. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431-33 (1909). Eventually, the insider's duty to the corporation was derivatively applied to the shareholders themselves. See generally
Langevoort, supra note 17, at 4-7 (tracing development of insider's fiduciary duty
to shareholders).
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sider's duty to disclose or abstain?'
The prohibition against insider trading under Rule IOb-5 is now
well established. 22 The investing public is similarly disadvantaged
when material, non public information is used by persons other than
insiders. Hence, a violation of Rule IOb-5 has been found when a nontrading insider, acting as a tipper, "tipped" this information to a tippee
who then traded on the basis of the information. Although it was acknowledged that tippees were sometimes subject to the duty to disclose
or abstain, the decisional law was inconsistent in delineating the source
of the tippee's duty and the scope of its application. 23
The analytical basis of the duty to abstain or disclose was explicated in the seminal 1961 SEC decision, In re Cady, Roberts & CO. 24 In
that case the director of an issuer of securities informed a partner of a
broker-dealer firm that a dividend reduction in the issuer's securities
was imminent. 25 The partner and his firm violated Rule 10_5 26 by selling shares of the security for discretionary accounts, with knowledge
that news of the dividend reduction had not been released to the publiC. 27 The duty to disclose or abstain was based on two factors: a relationship that afforded access to information that was intended "only for
a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone," and
the inherent unfairness involved when a person uses this information
"knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing."28
21. See L. Loss, supra note 20, at 1450-51. Under the tort law of misrepresentation,
affirmative disclosure is required when the parties are in a fiduciary relationship.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977).
22. See Langevoort, supra note 17, at I (citing cases).
23. Compare In re Raymond L. Dirks, (1981 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) ~ 82,812, at 83,945 (Jan. 22, 1981) (tipper viewed as aiding and abetting),
aff'd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983) with Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980) (tippee viewed as participant after the
fact). Cf Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1973) (under state common law, tippee is liable to the insurer as a coventurer of the insider), vacated sub
nom., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974). The legislative history of the
1934 Act is silent regarding the scope of section 1O(b). Sante Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 473 n.13 (1977) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
202 (1976»; see S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934) (sole reference to
§ 10 merely states that it was "aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices which. . . fulfill no useful function"); see also Langevoort, supra note 17, at
24-25 (early cases treated tippees as insiders, based on notions of fairness).
24. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
25. Id. at 909. The director was also an associate in the broker-dealer firm.
26. Id. at 911-12. The SEC also found a violation of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933. 15 U.S.c. § 77q(a) (1982); see supra note 7.
27. Scienter is a prerequisite to Rule 1Ob-5 liability-whether it be intent to deceive or
recklessness. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-91 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-04 (1976). Scienter is imputed to a tippee who
knew or should have known that the information was nonpublic and came from
an insider. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
237-38 (2d Cir. 1974); Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890
(2d Cir. 1972).
28. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. Acknowledging that the tipper, the director of
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The scope of the disclosure duty established in Cady, Roberts was
expanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur CO. 29 In that case, officials of a mining
development company learned of a copper strike and bought stock in
the company before the board of directors was informed of the mineral
find. 30 The Second Circuit held that the officials violated Rule lOb-5
by trading on material, non public information, but found it unneccessary to decide whether the duty to disclose or abstain was based on
fiduciary principles or on the existence of "special facts."31 Rather, the
Texas Gulf court relied on the congressional purpose of the rule, which
was to ensure fairness in securities transactions. The court emphasized
policy matters, including the investing public's right to expect that all
investors enjoy "relatively equal" access to material information. 32
Thus, the Texas Gulf decision went beyond the Cady, Roberts rationale
by dispensing with the need for a prior relationship affording access to
inside information. No relationship or regularity of access to inside information was required to create a duty to abstain or disclose. The
second element set forth in Cady, Roberts, the inherent unfairness in
the use of inside information for personal advantage, was deemed sufficient to justify the imposition of a disclosure duty on anyone possessing
inside information. 33
Following Cady, Roberts and Texas Gu!f, it was uncertain whether
the source of tippee liability was derivative, based on the insider's
breach of his fiduciary duty by tipping, or independent of that of the
insider, based on equitable principles of fairness. 34 Several cases indithe issuer, probably lacked scienter because he believed that the information had
already been released to the investing public, the SEC summarily concluded that
the tippee bore the tipper's duty to disclose or abstain. The SEC cited the law of
restitution for the proposition that one who receives confidential information from
a fiduciary, knowing that the fiduciary breaches his duty by the disclosure, is liable for any profit made through use of the information. ld. at n.17 (citing RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 201(2) (1937)). Thus, tippee liability
was established although Rule IOb-5 had not been violated by the tipper, because
the tipper had nonetheless violated his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by releasing confidential information. The Dirks Court also referred to this section.
Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983).
29.401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971).
30. Texas Gu{(,401 F.2d at 839-40.
31. ld. at 848; see supra note 20.
32. Texas Gu{(,401 F.2d at 848 (anyone possessing material inside information is restrained by the duty to disclose or abstain) (dictum).
33. ld. Although two of the defendants passed information to tippees, who subsequently purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur stock, the tippees were not defendants in
the case. The court noted that although the tippees' conduct "could be equally
reprehensible," it was not within the purview of the opinion. The tippers, however, were held liable for their gratuitous tips. ld. at 852-53. Texas Gu!fwas the
first case to hold that tipping violated Rule IOb-5. 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 13, § 7.5(3)(a).
34. See Langevoort, supra note 17, at 10.
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cated that a corporate fiduciary's Rule lOb-5 obligations passed to the
tippee anytime the insider revealed information to the tippee. 35 The
tippee breached this "inherited" fiduciary duty whenever he knowingly
traded on the basis of the information, or transmitted the inside information to someone likely to trade on its basis?6 The uncertainty surrounding tippee liability was compounded by the absence of any welldefined precedents concerning the nature of the insider's duty as a fiduciary under Rule lOb_5. 37
Decisional law indicated that an insider's duty to disclose or abstain was based upon the possession of material, non public information
rather than the insider's fiduciary duty to the shareholders. The equitable principle of fairness that underlay this rationale was, by implication, similarly applicable to tippees. In adopting this theory as the
basis of the disclosure obligation, the Second Circuit in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,38 found that tippee liability was
determined independently from the liability of the tipper. In Shapiro,
the prospective underwriter of a new issue of securities disclosed material, adverse information regarding the issuer's earnings to several of its
customers. The customers, most of whom were institutional investors,
subsequently sold 165,000 shares of the stock on a national exchange. 39
In finding that the disclosing underwriter and the selling customers
knew that the adverse earnings information was confidential, the Second Circuit held that both the non-trading tippers and the trading tippees violated Rule lOb-5. 40 The broad theory of insider liability set
forth in Texas Gu!f, requiring disclosure or abstention by anyone pos35. See Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972)
(one in possession of material inside information, be he an insider or a tippee,
must disclose or abstain); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395,410 (S:D.N.Y. 1967) ("if
[defendants] were not insiders, they would seem to have been 'tippees', . . . and
subject to the same duty as insiders").
36. See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261-62 (1983). The SEC adopted this position
in Dirks.
37. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Courts have yet to define clearly the
term "fiduciary." A fiduciary duty exists when there is an expectation of trust and
confidence created by the relationship or when the law implies this expectation.
See generally Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539 (1949) (discussing the nature of a fiduciary relationship).
38. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
39. Id. at 231-33. The shares sold by the tippees constituted one-half of the total
number of the issuer's shares sold during this time period, and the sales precipitated a "sudden and substantial" drop in the price of the security.
40. Id. at 237-38. The underwriter and the individual officers involved in the disclosure received compensation from the execution of the sell orders in the form of
commissions and "give-ups"-a percentage of the commissions earned by other
brokers who executed sale orders for the institutional investors. It is significant
that the court did not base the non-trading tippers' liability on personal gain. The
Shapiro court referred to Texas Gu!f, where tippers were found liable under Rule
lOb-5 for gratuitous tipping. Id. at 239; see supra note 33.
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sessing material inside information, was construed to include tippees. 41
In holding that the tippee's disclosure obligation was determined independently, the Shapiro court emphasized that the congressional purpose behind section 1O(b) was to ensure that all investors have
"relatively equal access to material information."42
Decisional law delineating both insider and tippee liability focused on the trading party's access to material, nonpublic information.
Courts did not inquire into the relationship between the tippee and the
shareholders who were disadvantaged by the trading. Therefore, any
rule determining tippee liability was predicated upon establishing the
basis of the insider's duty to disclose or abstain. The Supreme Court
first explored the relationship between the insider's fiduciary duty to
the shareholders and the Rule lOb-5 disclosure duty43 in Chiarella v.
United States. 44 Although Chiarella did not involve an insider or a tippee, the Court examined the source of the duty to disclose or abstain
and held that mere possession of material, nonpublic information did
not require disclosure. 45 In Chiarella, a financial printer prepared announcements of corporate takeover bids. Although the names of the
target companies were not revealed to the printer until the final printing, an employee of the printer deduced the company names from
other information in the announcements. 46 The employee's purchases
and resales of the target company's securities were held not to constitute fraud under Rule lOb-5 because the employee was not an insider
of the target company. Furthermore, the employee did not receive any
information from the target company and hence was not placed in a
position of trust and confidence,47 creating obligations similar to those
imposed on a fiduciary. The Chiarella Court expressly rejected regular
access to information as the basis for the obligation to disclose or abstain. 48 Mere possession of nonpublic market information was deemed
41. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 236. The implicit assumption in the decision is that the underwriter was an insider.
42. Id. at n.l3 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968),
cerl. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), cerl. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971». The Shapiro
court deemed it immaterial that a private damages action was involved, rather
than an SEC injunction action.
43. Langevoort, supra note 17, at 3.
44. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
45. Id. at 235.
46. Id. at 224.
47. Id. at 231-33. The disclose or abstain rule applies to other relationships of trust
besides that of a fiduciary. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972) (employees of a bank acting as stock transfer agents for Indian tribe);
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (registered investment advisor); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979) (financial
columnist).
48. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-37. The Court did not decide whether the employee
violated a duty as an agent of the offeror corporation by misappropriating confidential information for personal profit because that theory had not been included
in the jury instructions. This theory is difficult to apply to tippees because the
persons who are disadvantaged by the trading, those "who purchase or sell in
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insufficient to impose a Rule IOb-5 obligation to disclose or abstain;49
instead, a party must first establish a relationship of trust and confidence between the trading parties. 50
In a departure from the trend in prior decisional law, Chiarella
cast doubt upon the judicial assumption that anyone who knowingly
received inside information from an insider "inherited" the insider's
fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. 51 Although tippee liability
was not at issue in Chiarella, its holding obviated the rule previously set
forth by the Second Circuit that a disclosure duty arose whenever material, nonpublic information was obtained by virtue of a position affording access to this information. By requiring that a relationship
similar to that of a fiduciary exist before the disclosure obligation could
be implicated, it was uncertain what else besides "mere possession"
would be required to impose tippee liability. Tippees do not generally
have a prior relationship of trust or confidence with the corporate
shareholder, and therefore the analytical basis for imposing a disclosure duty upon tippees was placed in issue.
In J)irks v. SEC, 52 the Supreme Court held that in the absence of a
breach of the insider's fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain, the analyst
tippee was not obligated to disclose the inside information before trading. 53 The Court rejected the SEC's argument that a tippee "inherited"
a duty to disclose whenever he knowingly received inside information
as inconsistent with the requirement of a confidential relationship in
Chiarella. 54 The SEC's position was equated with the proposition that

49.
50.

51.

52.
53.
54.

connection with the security," are not only those sharehold:!rs whose information
is misappropriated. Id.
Id. at 235. The narrowness of the holding is significant, because Chiarella does
not affirmatively establish how much more than "mere" possession is required to
create a disclosure obligation.
Id. at 230. The Court's discussion concerning tippee liability, which was relegated
to a footnote, stated in part:
'Tippees' of corporate insiders have been held liable under § lO(b) because they have a duty not to profit from the use of inside information
that they know is confidential and know or should know came from a
corporate insider. [This] obligation has been viewed as arising from his
role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty.
Id. at 230 n.12 (citations omitted) (dictum).
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. The variety of legal theories
thought to underlie the disclosure obligation was reflected in the four opinions
issued in Chiarella. The two concurring opinions and one dissenting opinion indicated varying degrees of support for the misappropriation theory, while another
dissenting opinion advocated the Second Circuit's "regular access to inside information" theory. The latter was based on a trend in tort law that considered the
existence of "special facts" as a reason for imposing a duty to disclose in an action
for fraud when a confidential or fiduciary relationship is involved. Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 237-53 (Stevens, J., concurring) (Brennan J., concurring) (Burger, c.J.,
dissenting) (Blackman, J., dissenting); see supra note 20.
103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
Id. at 3265.
Id. at 3261-63.
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Rule IOb-S requires equal information among all traders, a view that
conflicted with Chiarellds directive that not all persons trading on inside information were subject to the duty to disclose. 55 After emphasizing that market analysts contribute to the preservation of a healthy
securities market by "ferreting out" information, the Court cautioned
that imposing Rule IOb-S liability on all recipients of material, nonpublic information could inhibit the role of analysts in fulfilling a legitimate and necessary market function. 56
The Court referred to its statement in Chiarella that tippee liability
arose from the tippee's role as a participant after the fact and concluded that the tippee's duty to disclose is derivative from the breach of
the insider's disclosure duty.57 The Dirks Court interpreted the Cady,
Roberts insider trading requirement of a relationship affording access
to inside information to mean the tippee must assume a fiduciary duty
to the shareholders before incurring liability.58
The Dirks Court delineated a two factor test to determine when
tippees must assume a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain from trading. First, an insider must breach his fiduciary duty to the shareholders
by disclosing the information, and second, the tippee must know or
have reason to know that there has been a breach. 59 The Court, however, noted that not all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a
securities transaction constitute fraud under Rule IOb-S. 60 The majority reasoned that fraud requires deception or manipulation, and in the
insider trading context the deception lies in the unfairness that results
when inside information is used for personal profit by one who knows
the information is confidential. The Dirks Court thus concluded that
an insider breaches his fiduciary duty by tipping only when he benefits
from the disclosure. 61 The tipping by the former officer and other employees was aimed at revealing the fraudulent practices. The majority
reasoned that the tippers did not intend to profit from the tip, and consequently they did not violate their fiduciary duty to the corporation's
shareholders. The analyst, therefore, as tippee, did not acquire a derivative duty to disclose or abstain. 62
55. Id. at 3262. Market professionals are exempt from the prohibition against members of national securities exchange trading for their own accounts. Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.c. § 78k(a)(I) (1982). This exemption was cited as evidencing
Congress' intent not to require parity of information among investors. See
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233-34 n.16 (1980) ("the exception is
based upon Congress' recognition that [market professionals] contribute to a fair
and orderly marketplace . . . .").
56. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
57. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980).
58. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261.
59. Id.; see A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 § 167 (1975).
60. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258; see Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d CiT. 1976).
61. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3260.
62. Id. at 3263-65. The Court also held that the analyst was not an insider since he
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Courts have traditionally construed the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities acts broadly in light of their remedial purposes, and
therefore have not strictly adhered to the technical requirements of
common law fraud. 63 The principle of equitable fraud, which is based
on general considerations of fairness rather than specific elements, has
been applied in SEC enforcement actions brought under the federal
antifraud provisions. 64 The expansive application of the antifraud provisions is partially attributable to a recognition that the common law
doctrine of fraud developed in personal transactions involving tangible
commodities, and is unsuited to transactions dealing with intangible
securities, which are often traded anonymously through national exchanges. 65 Dirks departs from the trend in prior tippee trading cases,
which liberally imposed tippee liability based upon general notions of
fairness. 66 The tipper's breach of fiduciary duty was formerly relevant
in tippee liability cases for determining the existence of scienter on the
part of the tippee. 67
The premise underlying the majority decision, that the fraudulent
act in tippee trading must necessarily be committed by the tipping insider, is analytically unsound and produces inconsistent results. The
majority acknowledges that the prohibition against insider trading derives from a judgment that this trading is unfair. 68 This conclusion is in
accordance with the common law doctrine of equitable fraud in that its

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

did not induce the shareholders or officers of the defrauding company to place
their trust or confidence in him. The tippers were never charged by the SEC. Id.
See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir.
1974).
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192-94 (1963).
One commentator explained that "[f]raud has a broader meaning in equity . . .
and intention to defraud or misrepresent is not a necessary element." W. DE
FUNlAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 235 (2d ed. 1956) (quoted in Capital
Gains, 375 U.S. at 193). Thus, materiality substitutes for reliance, and privity is
not required. See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 198-201; A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 13, §§ 8.6-8.7(2) (1979).
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606,614 (2d Cir. 1962)
(Clark, J., dissenting). See generally Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities
Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 227-30 (1933) (common law of tort and contract applied
piecemeal to securities transactions; a comprehensive underlying policy was rarely
articulated).
See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. Dirks is consistent with the holding
in Chiarella that a position affording access to material, non public information
suffices as a basis for imposing Rule IOb-5 liability. See Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 235-37 (1980).
See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983);
Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 178 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 919 (1980); Woodwarth v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir.
1975); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 641 (1971); supra note 27.
See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983) (quoting In re Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.c. 933, 936 (1968)).
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primary goal is to prevent overreaching. 69 The insider's purpose in tipping, however, is not what renders tippee trading unfair. The unfairness inheres in the tippee's manipulation70 of confidential information
by trading in the corporation's securities. Only then are persons who
trade "in connection with the purchase or sale" of the security disadvantaged by the tippee trading. 71 In Dirks the inside information was
lawf-ully-obtained by the tippee, but was unfairly used to allow the institutional investors to unload worthless stock on the investing public.
As courts and commentators have recognized, the mere act of tipping
without subsequent trading does not violate Rule lOb-5 because no loss
is suffered by investors, and therefore there is no deception. 72 In this
respect the tippee is the principle wrongdoer and not, as the majority
characterizes him, a participant after the fact. 73 Thus, since trading by
the tippee is necessary to consummate a violation, the majority's characterization is inaccurate.
The result produced by the rationale in Dirks undermines the general objectives of the federal securities law, i.e., protecting the investing
public and ensuring the integrity of the securities markets. 74 The
69. See Langevoort, supra note 17, at 19,24,26. Under the proposed Federal Securities Code, tippees are classified as insiders when their relationship to the issuer
gives them access to such information or else they receive the information from
such a person. FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(b)(3)-(4) (1972); see W. PAINTER, THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 5.03, at 162-63
(1979).
70. Ironically, the Supreme Court found Congress' use of the word "manipulative"
particularly significant in an earlier case when the Court noted that it was a term
of art in the securities' vernacular, connoting fraud that is effected through control
of security prices. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
71. The jurisdictional requirement of Rule IOb-5 prohibits fraudulent practices that
are employed "in connection with the purchase or sale of [the traded security]."
17 C.F.R. 240.lOb-5 (1983). Thus, defrauded persons with standing may not include the corporate shareholders if they have not bought or sold during the time
that the tippee traded on the inside information. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (offerees ofa stock offering who were not shareholders and did not purchase stock lacked standing under Rule IOb-5 in action for
alleged misrepresentation in the offering prospectus). Arguably, tippee liability
should not be predicated on the violation of a fiduciary duty owed to persons not
within the aegis of Rule IOb-5.
72. See Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 169 (2d Cir. 1980) (tipping of
confidential information violates insider's fiduciary duty, but no injury occurs until the information is used by the tippee); A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra
note 13, at §§ 7.5(3)(b), .5(4); Langevoort, supra note 17, at 25-26. But see SEC v.
Glen Alden Corp., [1968 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,280
(insiders enjoined from disclosing material inside information, despite absence of
tippee trading).
73. See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3264 (1983) (quoting Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)). The tipper is more accurately characterized
as an aider and abettor. See In re Raymond L. Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,812 (Jan. 22, 1981), ajf'd, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
74. E.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235
(2d Cir. 1974); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d
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losses suffered by investors as a result of tippee trading are the same,
regardless of the insider's motive for tipping.75 When multiple tippers
and tippees are involved, it is anomalous to impose liability only upon
those tippees whose insider sources benefited from tipping, if the tippees themselves are equally culpable. In addition, courts will differ on
what benefits tippers, and the tipper's subjective purpose in tipping will
be difficult to prove. 76 The dissent argued that the majority implanted
a motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty doctrine. 77 In rebutting the majority's interpretation of the law regarding fiduciaries, the
dissent drew an analogy to the fiduciary duty of a trustee. The trustee's
duty is breached by knowing conduct that causes a loss to the trust,
regardless of whether profit accrues to the trustee. 78 Further support
for the dissent's approach is found in the rule that a director's fiduciary
duty to the shareholders varies, depending upon the substantive law
governing the particular fiduciary relation. 79 A tipping insider's breach
should be determined by reference to prior decisional law, where tipper
liability was premised on whether it was reasonably foreseeable that a
disclosure would result in trading by the tippee. 8o
By adopting a standard of tippee liability that is generally unsupported by either prior decisionallaw81 or the objectives of the federal

75.
76.

77.
78.

79.
80.
81.

Cir. 1969), cerl. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968), cerl. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), cerl. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971).
Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3271 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See it!. at 3272 n.l3. Dirks indisputably received compensation in the form of
additional clients and enhanced reputation. It!. at 3269 nA. The Court included
benefit to reputation as a form of profit that could accrue to the tipper. It!. at
3265-66; see Brudney, supra note 12, at 348. It is arguable that at least the former
officer personally benefited from his disclosure since his professional reputation
would be enhanced when his role in exposing the fraud was made public.
It!. at 3270-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that personal
gain by the insider is a result that the securities laws were intended to prevent,
rather than an element of a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. It!. at 3269.
It!. at 3271; see also Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951) (trustee liable for
allowing employees to possess interests adverse to the trust, even though trustee
did not benefit therefrom), ciled in Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3271-72 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 170(2) (1959) (trustee is under duty to deal fairly with beneficiary and to act for
his benefit).
A. SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 495, at 3534 (3d ed. 1967).
Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 1980); if. Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974).
See Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d. Cir. 1980) ("knowing
use by insiders of inside information for their own benefit or Ihal 0/ tippees violates Rule IOb-5") (emphasis supplied); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) ("We do not believe that Congress intended that . . . the
Act would not be violated unless [deceptive insider activity] was motivated by a
plan to benefit the corporation or themselves"), cerl. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969),
cerl. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). Bul see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222,230 n.12 (1979). As cogently noted by the dissent in Dirks, the only support
cited in Chiarella for the proposition that tippee liability arises from a tippee's role
as a participant after the fact is an ABA Comment Letter. It!. (citing SUBCOMMIT-
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securities laws, Dirks appears to represent an effort to limit jurisdiction
under Rule lOb-S. 82 The Dirks decision immunizes a large class of
trading tippees, including professional analysts and ordinary investors,
who profit from the use of confidential information obtained by means
other than "diligence and acumen."83 Perhaps Congress will eventually prohibit tip~ee trading expressly to close the gap left open by the
Court's holding. 4

Nancy I. Knapp

TEE OF ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING, AND BUSINESS LAW, COMMENT LETTER ON MATERIAL, NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION (Oct. 15, 1973),
reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) Report No. 233, at D-l, D-2 (Jan. 2,
1974».
82. See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3268 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 252 n.2 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
84. Subsequent to Chiarella, Congress enacted Rule 14e-3 under section 14(e) of the
1934 Act. This rule prevents anyone from using inside information that is acquired from a representative of either the target or offeror in a tender offer. 17
C.P.R. § 240. 14e-3 (1983).

